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BOOK REVIEWS

Civil Disagreement: Personal Integrity in a Pluralistic Society, by Edward
Langerak. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014. ix + 170
pages (paper).
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University
The opening words of this excellent book are these: “A pluralistic society
is one that includes individuals and groups with different and conflicting
convictions about what constitutes a good life. These convictions are so
important to the personal identities of its members that their integrity requires open disagreement with each other. But maintaining the social and
political ties necessary to a peaceful society requires that they disagree in
a civil way.” The project of the book is to explain what it is to disagree in a
civil way and to elaborate on why disagreeing civilly is important.
After an opening chapter devoted to distinguishing different types of
claims, different types of disagreements, and different reasons for offering arguments, Langerak turns, in the second chapter, to analyzing the
various ways in which ours is a pluralistic society. One of the things that
impressed this reader about this chapter, and about the book as a whole,
was the lucidity and propriety of the distinctions that the author draws.
It happens sometimes that philosophers draw distinctions so as to dazzle
the reader with the author’s facility at drawing distinctions. Not so
Langerak. Discussions in the area that Langerak is dealing with are full of
terminological confusion; crucial terms are used with different meanings.
Langerak performs a great service in drawing distinctions that dispel the
confusion.
The meaning of the multivalent term “pluralism” that is most important
for Langerak’s purposes is the meaning that he calls “perspective pluralism.” By virtue of differences in our experience and reflections, we human
beings have many different perspectives on what is real and on what is
good and right, with the result, writes Langerak, that “any number of
claims, theories and ways of life, including moral and religious outlooks,
will be judged right or wrong—or reasonable or unreasonable—depending on our respective perspectives” (51). Langerak affirms the principle
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that something that is reasonable for one person to believe, given that
person’s perspective, may not be reasonable for another person to believe,
given that person’s perspective. (I myself would prefer the term “entitled”
to the term “reasonable.”)
He spends some time in the chapter dispelling the fear some readers
might have that the relativity of reasonableness implies the relativity of
truth. Whether or not some proposition is true is independent of whether
or not it’s reasonable for one or another person to believe it. Some of my
reasonable beliefs may be false, some of my unreasonable beliefs may be
true. Truth does not track with reasonableness. Langerak is not a relativist
on truth.
In the third chapter, Langerak moves on to discuss toleration. The
chapter opens with these words: “In a pluralistic society we can and
should engage in open-minded conversations during which we listen
as much as we talk, engage in sincere dialogues during which we try to
see the issues the way others do, and engage in mutual inquiries during
which we patiently and fair-mindedly examine each others’ arguments.
However, we cannot expect that these well intentioned efforts will bring
consensus” (77). In many cases, what we ought then to do is tolerate beliefs we disagree with or behavior that we disapprove of. Langerak goes
on to dispel conceptual confusion by distinguishing various senses of
“toleration” and arguing—correctly, I think—that its central meaning is
that of enduring, or putting up with, beliefs that one regards as false or
behavior that one regards as wrong. It’s the best discussion of toleration
that I know of.
Shortly after the passage just quoted, Langerak writes, “Of course, even
a pluralistic society finds itself with crimes and other forms of behavior
that no civil society can endure, so appropriate intolerance will always
have its place. Indeed, moral progress in history is often marked precisely
by civilized societies’ becoming intolerant of oppressive practices such as
slavery and various forms of unjustified discrimination” (77). Langerak
repeats the point a few times; but he never develops it.
I wish he had. I realize that it may seem churlish of me to dun him
for what he does not say after praising him for what he does say. It’s the
classic strategy of reviewers: if you can’t fault the author on what he did
say, fault him on what he did not say. But here’s my point: in pluralistic
societies, it’s just as important that we seek to eliminate or diminish what
is intolerable as that we tolerate what is tolerable.
The picture that comes through, both in Langerak’s discussion and in
the literature that he engages, is that of a well-ordered faculty meeting in
which each member feels free to state his position, in which each member
is capable of defending that position with arguments, and in which each
member listens openly and attentively to the position and arguments of
those who see things differently. Not all faculty meetings are like that;
discussions in civil society are seldom like that. Chicanery, corruption,
self-interest, and domination are defended with threats, deception, bribes,
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cronyism, and the like. Jeff Stout’s book Blessed Are the Organized contains
some vivid examples.
For reasons not clear to me, the tracks on which discussions concerning toleration and public discourse proceed never intersect with those on
which discussions concerning the righting of injustice proceed. I think it
would be a great contribution if someone integrated reflections on tolerating disagreements that are tolerable with reflections on struggling to
eliminate behavior that is intolerable. Achieving personal integrity in a
pluralistic society requires both forms of activity.
In his fourth chapter Langerak engages the public reason debate. Given
the fact of perspective pluralism in our society, how should we conduct
our debates on public policy and prospective legislation? As one would
expect, he takes note of Rawls’s restraint principle: on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, “conscientious citizens ought to restrain
themselves from using nonpublic reasons to advocate or vote for coercive
legislation unless they also are willing and able to provide public reasons
for it” (113), public reasons being those that citizens “can reasonably expect
their compatriots could reasonably accept” (114).
After discussing various alternative principles, Langerak settles for a
clarification of Rawls’s principle. Rawls’s restraint principle can be interpreted as affirming either a prima facie obligation of citizens or an all-thingsconsidered principle. Langerak proposes that it be interpreted as affirming
a prima facie obligation, one that can be overridden, though “only in certain
carefully considered circumstances.” What then follows is a subtle and insightful discussion of the sorts of things one should consider in deciding
whether or not, in a given case, to override the restraint principle. This is a
valuable contribution to the literature.
Let me make two comments about Langerak’s affirmation of the Rawlsian
restraint principle. First, the discussion of what should happen is once
again idealized. Langerak’s discussion of public reason is like all discussions of public reason in that, here too, the picture that hovers over the
discussion is that of a well-ordered faculty meeting.
Consider Aunt Mabel. She doesn’t like engaging in arguments. It
doesn’t matter whether the arguments are on political matters, on religious matters, on ecological matters, she doesn’t like engaging in arguments. She’s not opposed to arguments as such; she doesn’t mind listening
in on arguments, provided they are civil. But she doesn’t like to engage in
them herself. When an election or a referendum is coming up, she listens
carefully to what the candidates or the proponents are saying. She finds
that she doesn’t always understand what they are saying; she didn’t understand much about the Affordable Health Care Act, for example. So her
aim in listening is to settle on who she can trust; that’s who she votes for.
There are a lot of Aunt Mabels in our society. And all of us sometimes
act like Aunt Mabel. Nobody has time to argue about all political issues,
not even all important ones.
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Is Aunt Mabel failing in her obligations of citizenship? We can agree
that she is not the ideal citizen. But is she failing in her obligations? Not
so far as I can see. It’s because I don’t regard Aunt Mabel as failing in
her obligations of citizenship that, in my writing about these matters,
I have never tried to specify the sorts of arguments that citizens should
give on political matters; I have confined myself to discussing which sorts
of arguments they are are permitted to give. Given that I think citizens
are not obligated to give any arguments at all, it’s my view that they are
not obligated to give arguments of a certain sort. Are certain kinds of
citizens obligated to give arguments in certain kinds of situations? Am
I, for example, a professional philosopher, sometimes obligated to give
arguments? Perhaps. But I have no idea whatsoever how to specify
which kinds of citizens are obligated to give arguments in which kinds of
situations.
My second comment about Langerak’s discussion of public reason is
that when we put together his acceptance of Rawls’s definition of public
reason with his main thesis concerning perspective pluralism, it appears
that there are very few, if any, public reasons. Here, once again, is the
definition of “public reasons” that Langerak takes over from Rawls: public reasons “are those that advocates in the public square can reasonably
expect their compatriots could reasonably accept.” The locution “could
reasonably accept” is vague. Presumably what’s meant is this: public
reasons are reasons that advocates can reasonably expect that all of their
compatriots could reasonably accept given the perspectives that those compatriots actually have. It’s not relevant what one’s compatriots reasonably
believe in some other possible world where their perspectives are different
from what they are in the actual world. Now recall Langerak’s thesis concerning perspective pluralism: a proposition that is reasonable for one
person to believe, given his perspective, may not be reasonable for another
person to believe, given her perspective. I join with Langerak in affirming
this principle.
Here’s the question: are there reasons that those of us who are advocates can reasonably expect that all of our compatriots could reasonably
accept given the perspectives that those compatriots actually have? Presumably there are some things that everybody could reasonably accept—
that 1 + 1 = 2, for example. But we are talking here about reasons relevant
to debating prospective legislation and public policy. Given the enormous
diversity of perspectives in our society, I see no reason to believe that there
are any public reasons—or to speak more cautiously, no reason to believe
that there are enough public reasons to settle the wide range of political
issues that we face. I think that what all of us “can reasonably expect” concerning our compatriots is that, if there are any public reasons, there aren’t
enough of them. Given Langerak’s thesis that reasonableness is relative
to perspectives, the box containing public reasons is empty, or nearly so.

